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Abstract
We study distributed optimization in the presence of Byzantine adversaries, where both data and
computation are distributed amongm worker machines, t of which can be corrupt and collaboratively
deviate arbitrarily from their pre-specified programs, and a designated (master) node iteratively
computes the model/parameter vector for generalized linear models. In this work, we primarily
focus on two iterative algorithms: Proximal Gradient Descent (PGD) and Coordinate Descent (CD).
Gradient descent (GD) is a special case of these algorithms. PGD is typically used in the data-
parallel setting, where data is partitioned across different samples, whereas, CD is used in the
model-parallelism setting, where the data is partitioned across the parameter space.
In this paper, we propose a method based on data encoding and error correction over real num-
bers to combat adversarial attacks. We can tolerate up to t ≤ bm−12 c corrupt worker nodes, which
is information-theoretically optimal. We give deterministic guarantees, and our method does not
assume any probability distribution on the data. We develop a sparse encoding scheme which en-
ables computationally efficient data encoding and decoding. We demonstrate a trade-off between
corruption threshold and the resource requirement (storage and computational/communication com-
plexity). As an example, for t ≤ m3 , our scheme incurs only a constant overhead on these resources,
over that required by the plain distributed PGD/CD algorithms which provide no adversarial pro-
tection.
Our encoding scheme extends efficiently to (i) the data streaming model, in which data samples
come in an online fashion and are encoded as they arrive, and (ii) making stochastic gradient descent
(SGD) Byzantine-resilient. In the end, we give experimental results to show the efficacy of our
method.
1 Introduction
Map-reduce architecture [DG08] is implemented in many distributed learning tasks, where there is
one designated machine (called the master) that computes the model iteratively, based on the inputs
from the worker machines at each iteration, typically using descent techniques, like (proximal) gradient
descent, coordinate descent, stochastic gradient descent, the Newton’s method, etc. The worker nodes
perform the required computations using local data, distributed to the nodes [ZWLS10]. Several other
architectures, including having no hierarchy among the nodes have been explored [LZZ+17].
In several applications of distributed learning, including the Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT)
[A+18], federated optimization [Kon17], the recruited worker nodes might be partially trusted with their
∗This paper was presented in parts at the IEEE Allerton 2018 (as an invited talk), and IEEE ISIT 2019. Part of this
work was done when Linqi Song was at UCLA. The work of Deepesh Data and Suhas Diggavi was partially supported by
the Army Research Laboratory under Cooperative Agreement W911NF-17-2-0196, by the UC-NL grant LFR-18-548554,
and by the NSF award 1740047. The work of Linqi Song was partially supported by the NSF award 1527550, 1514531,
and by the City University of Hong Kong grant (No. 7200594). The views and conclusions contained in this document
are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of
the Army Research Laboratory or the U.S. Government. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute
reprints for Government purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation here on.
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computation. Therefore, an important question is whether we can reliably perform distributed compu-
tation, taking advantage of partially trusted worker nodes. These Byzantine adversaries can collaborate
and arbitrarily deviate from their pre-specified programs. The problem of distributed computation with
Byzantine adversaries has a long history [LSP82], and there has been recent interest in applying this
computational model to large-scale distributed learning [BMGS17,CWCP18,CSX17].
In this paper, we study Byzantine-tolerant distributed optimization to learn a regularized generalized
linear model (e.g., linear/ridge regression, logistic regression, Lasso, SVM dual, constrained minimiza-
tion, etc.). We consider two frameworks for distributed optimization: (i) data-parallelism architecture,
where data points are distributed across different worker nodes, and in each iteration, they all par-
allelly compute gradients on their local data and master aggregates them to update the parameter
vector using gradient descent (GD) [BT89, Bot10, DCM+12]; and (ii) model-parallelism architecture,
where data points are partitioned across the features, and several worker nodes work in parallel on
updating different subsets of coordinates of the model/parameter vector through coordinate descent
(CD) [BKBG11,Wri15,RT16]. Note that GD requires full gradients to update the parameter vector;
and if full gradients are too costly to compute, we can reduce the per-iteration cost by using CD,1 which
also has been shown to be very effective for solving generalized linear models, and is particularly widely
used for sparse logistic regression, SVM, and Lasso [BKBG11]. Given its simplicity and effectiveness,
CD can be chosen over GD in such applications [Nes12]. Computing gradients in the presence of Byzan-
tine adversaries has been recently studied [BMGS17,CWCP18,CSX17], but as far as we know, making
CD robust to Byzantine adversaries has not received much attention. In addition to gradient descent,
this motivates us to explore how to make coordinate descent also robust to Byzantine adversaries.
In this paper, we propose Byzantine-resilient distributed optimization algorithms both for PGD and
CD based on data encoding and error correction (over real numbers). Our proposed algorithm differs
from existing Byzantine-resilient distributed learning algorithms in one or more of the following aspects:
(i) it does not make statistical assumptions on the data or Byzantine attack patterns; (ii) it can tolerate
up to a constant fraction (< 1/2) of the worker nodes being Byzantine, which is information-theoretically
optimal; and (iii) it enables a trade-off (in terms of storage and computation/communication overhead
at the master and the worker nodes) with Byzantine adversary tolerance, without compromising the
efficiency at the master node.
Our algorithms encode the data used by the m worker nodes, using ideas from real-error correction
to enable tolerance to Byzantine workers. We develop an efficient “decoding” scheme at the master
node to process the inputs from the workers, either to compute the true gradient in the case of gradient
descent or to facilitate the computation at the worker nodes in the case of coordinate descent. We take
a two-round approach in each iteration of both these algorithms. Our main results are summarized
in Theorem 1 for GD and Theorem 2 for CD, and demonstrate a trade-off between the Byzantine
resilience (in terms of the number of adversarial nodes) and the resource requirement (storage and
computational/communication complexity). Our coding schemes can handle both Byzantine attacks
and missing updates (e.g., caused by delay and asynchrony of worker nodes). Though data encoding is
a one-time process, it has to be efficient to harness the advantage of distributed computation. We design
a sparse encoding process, based on real-error correction [CT05], which enables efficient encoding, and
the worker nodes alternatively locally encode using the sparse structure. This allows encoding with
storage redundancy of 2m/(m − 2t) (which is a constant, even if t is a constant fraction of m), and
one-time total computation cost for encoding is O((1 + 2t)nd).
We extend our encoding scheme in a couple of important ways: first, to make the stochastic gradient
descent algorithm Byzantine-resilient without compromising on the resource requirements; and second,
to handle streaming data efficiently, where data arrives in batches (and we encode them as they arrive),
rather than being available at the beginning of the computation; we also give few more applications of
our method. For the streaming model, more specifically, our encoding requires the same amount of time,
irrespective of whether we get all the data at once, or we get data points one by one or in batches. This
setting encompasses a more realistic scenario, in which we design our coding scheme with the initial set
of data points and distribute the encoded data among the workers. Later on, when we get some more
1Alternatively, we can also use SGD to reduce the per-iteration cost, and we give a method for making SGD Byzantine-
resilient in Section 6.1.
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samples, we can easily incorporate them into our existing encoded setup. See Section 6 for details on
these extensions.
Paper organization. Our problem formulation and the main results, along-with the high level ideas
of our Byzantine-resilient algorithms for both PGD and CD are given in Section 2. We give related work
in Section 3. We present our full coding schemes for gradient descent and coordinate descent along with
a complete analysis of their resource requirements in Section 4 and Section 5, respectively. In Section 6,
we show how our method can be extended to SGD and to the data streaming model. We also discuss
applicability of our method to a few more important applications in that section. In Section 7, we show
numerical results of our method: we show the efficiency of our method by running it on two datasets
(moderate and large) and plotting the running time with varying number of corrupt worker nodes (up
to <1/2 fraction). We conclude with a short discussion in Section 8.
Notation. We denote vectors by bold small letters (e.g., x,y, z, etc.) and matrices by bold capital
letters (e.g., A,F,S,X, etc.). We denote the amount of storage required by a matrix X by |X|. For any
positive integer n ∈ N, we denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n} by [n]. For n1, n2 ∈ N, where n1 ≤ n2, we write
[n1 : n2] to denote the set {n1, n1 + 1, . . . , n2}. For any vector u ∈ Rn and any set S ⊂ [n], we write
uS to denote the |S|-length vector, which is the restriction of u to the coordinates in the set S. The
support of a vector u ∈ Rn is defined by supp(u) := {i ∈ [n] : ui 6= 0}. We say that a vector u ∈ Rn
is t-sparse if |supp(u)| ≤ t. While stating our results, we assume that performing the basic arithmetic
operations (addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division) on real numbers take unit time.
2 Problem Setting and Our Results
Given a dataset consisting of n labelled data points (xi, yi) ∈ Rd × R, i ∈ [n], we want to learn a
model/parameter vector w ∈ Rd, which is a minimizer of the following convex optimization problem:
min
w∈Rd
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
fi(w)
)
+ h(w), (1)
where fi(w), i = 1, 2, . . . , n, denotes the empirical risk associated with the i’th data point with respect to
w and h(w) denotes a regularizer. We call f(w) := 1n
∑n
i=1 fi(w) the average empirical risk associated
with the n data points with respect to w. Our main focus in this paper is on generalized linear models
(GLM), where fi(w) = `(〈xi,w〉; yi) for some differentiable loss function `. Here each fi : Rd → R is
differentiable, h : Rd → R is convex but not necessarily differentiable, and 〈xi,w〉 is the dot product
of xi and w. We do not necessarily need each fi to be convex, but we require f(w) to be a convex
function. Note that f(w) + h(w) is a convex function. In the following we study different algorithms
for solving (1) to learn a GLM.
2.1 Proximal Gradient Descent
We can solve (1) using Proximal Gradient Descent (PGD). This is an iterative algorithm, in which we
choose an initial w0 ∈ Rd randomly, and then update the parameter vector according to the following
update rule:
wt+1 = proxh,αt(wt − αt∇f(wt)), t = 1, 2, 3, . . . (2)
where αt is the step size or the learning rate at the t’th iteration, determining the convergence behaviour.
There are standard choices for it; see, for example, [BV04, Chapter 9]. For any h and α, the proximal
operator proxh,α : Rd → R is defined as
proxh,α(w) = arg min
z∈Rd
1
2α
‖z−w‖22 + h(z). (3)
Observe that if h = 0, then proxh,α(w) = w for every w ∈ Rd, and PGD reduces to the classical
gradient descent (GD). This encompasses several important optimization problems related to learning,
for which prox operator has a closed form expression; some of these problems are given below.
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• Lasso: Here fi(w) = 12(〈xi,w〉 − yi)2 and h(w) = λ‖w‖1. It turns out that proxh,α(z) for Lasso
is equal to the soft-thresholding operator Sλα(z) [Tib15], which, for j ∈ [d], is defined as
(Sλα(z))j =

zj + λα if zj < −λα,
0 if − λα ≤ zj ≤ λα,
zj − λα if zj > λα.
• SVM dual: Jaggi [Jag13] showed an equivalence between the dual formulation of Support Vector
Machine (SVM) and Lasso. Hence, SVM dual is also a special case of (1).
• Constrained optimization: We want to solve a constrained minimization problem minw∈C f(w),
where C ⊆ Rd is a closed, convex set. Define an indicator function IC for C as follows: IC(w) := 0,
if w ∈ C; and IC(w) :=∞, otherwise. Now, observe the following equivalence
min
w∈C
f(w) ⇐⇒ min
w∈Rd
f(w) + IC(w).
If we solve the RHS using PGD, then it can be easily verified that the corresponding proximal
operator is equal to the projection operator onto the set C [Tib15]. So, the proximal gradient
update step is to compute the usual gradient and then project it back onto the set C.
• Logistic regression: Here fi is the logistic function, defined as
fi(w) = −yi log
(
1
1 + e−ui
)
− (1− yi) log
(
e−ui
1 + e−ui
)
,
where ui = 〈xi,w〉, and h = 0. As noted earlier, since h = 0, PGD reduces to GD for logistic
regression.
• Ridge regression: Here fi(w) = 12(〈xi,w〉 − yi)2 and h(w) = λ2‖w‖22. Since fi’s and h are
differentiable, we can alternatively solve this simply using GD.
Let X ∈ Rn×d denote the data matrix, whose i’th row is equal to the i’th data point xi. For
simplicity, assume that m divides n, and let Xi denote the nm × d matrix, whose j’th row is equal to
x(i−1) n
m
+j . In a distributed setup, all the data is distributed among m worker machines (worker i has
Xi) and master updates the parameter vector using the update rule (2). At the t’th iteration, master
sends wt to all the workers; worker i computes the gradient (denoted by ∇if(wt)) on its local data and
sends it to the master; master aggregates all the received m local gradients to obtain the global gradient
∇f(wt) = 1
m
m∑
i=1
∇if(wt). (4)
Now, master updates the parameter vector according to (2) and obtains wt+1. Repeat the process until
convergence.
If full gradients are too costly to compute. Updating the parameter vector in each iteration of
PGD (2) requires to compute full gradients. This may be prohibitive in some large-scale applications,2
where one has to make progress (i.e., updating the parameter vector in the right direction) quickly,
because each update gets delayed by computing the full gradient. In such scenarios, there are two
alternatives to reduce this per-iteration cost: (i) Coordinate Descent (CD), in which we pick a few
coordinates (at random), compute the partial gradient along those, and descent along those coordinates
only, and (ii) Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD), in which we sample a data point at random, compute
the gradient on that point, and descent along that direction. These are discussed in Section 2.2 and
Section 6.1, respectively.
2For example, in a situation, where each machine in a distributed framework has a lot of data, computing full gradients
even at the local machine may be too expensive.
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2.2 Coordinate Descent
For clear exposition of the ideas, we focus on the non-regularized empirical risk minimization from
(1) for learning a generalized linear model (GLM). This can be generalized to objectives with (non-
)differentiable regularizers [BKBG11, ST11]. Let X ∈ Rn×d denote the data matrix and y ∈ Rn the
corresponding label vector. To make it distinct from the last section, we denote the objective function
by φ and write it as φ(Xw;y) to emphasize that we want to learn a GLM, where the objective function
depends on the data points only through their inner products with the parameter vector. Formally, we
want to optimize3
min
w∈Rd
φ(Xw;y) :=
n∑
i=1
`(〈xi,w〉; yi). (5)
For U ⊆ [d], we write ∇Uφ(Xw;y) to denote the gradient of φ(Xw;y) with respect to wU , where wU
denotes the |U|-length vector obtained by restricting w to the coordinates in U . To make the notation
less cluttered, let φ′(Xw;y) denote the n-length vector, whose i’th entry is equal to `′(〈xi,w〉; yi) :=
∂
∂u`(u; yi)|u=〈xi,w〉. Note that ∇φ(Xw;y) = XTφ′(Xw;y) and that ∇Uφ(Xw;y) = XTUφ′(Xw;y),
where XU denotes the n × |U| matrix obtained by restricting the column indices of X to the elements
in U .
Coordinate descent (CD) is an iterative algorithm, where, in each iteration, we choose a set of
coordinates and update only those coordinates (while keeping the other coordinates fixed). In distributed
CD, we take advantage of the parallel architecture to improve the running time of (centralized) CD. In
the distributed setting, we divide the data matrix vertically into m parts and store the i’th part at the
i’th worker node. Concretely, assume, for simplicity, that m divides d. Let X = [X1 X2 . . . Xm] and
w = [wT1 w
T
2 . . . w
T
m]
T , where each Xi is an n× (d/m) matrix and each wi is length d/m vector. Each
worker i stores Xi and is responsible for updating (a few coordinates of) wi – hence the terminology,
model-parallelism. We can store the label vector y either with the master or with the workers. In
coordinate descent, since we update only a few coordinates in each round, there are a few options on
how to update these coordinates in a distributed manner:
Subset of workers: Master picks a subset S ⊂ [m] of workers and asks them to update their
wi’s [RT16]. This may not be good in the adversarial setting, because if only a small subset of workers
are updating their parameters, the adversary can corrupt those workers and disrupt the computation.
Subset of coordinates for all workers: All the worker nodes update only a subset of the coordinates
of their local parameter vector wi’s. Master can (deterministically or randomly) pick a subset U (which
may or may not be different for all workers) of f ≤ d/m coordinates and asks each worker to updates only
those coordinates. If master picks U deterministically, it can cycle through and update all coordinates
of the parameter vector in dd/mfe iterations.
In Algorithm 1 on page 6, we give the distributed CD algorithm with the second approach, where
all the worker nodes update the coordinates of their local parameter vectors for a single subset U . We
will adopt this approach in our method to make the distributed CD Byzantine-resilient. Let r = d/m.
For any i ∈ [m], let wi = [wi1 wi2 . . . wir]T and Xi = [Xi1 Xi2 . . .Xir], where Xij is the j’th column
of Xi. For any i ∈ [m] and U ⊆ [r], let wiU denote the |U|-length vector that is obtained from wi by
restricting its entries to the coordinates in U ; similarly, let XiU denote the n× |U| matrix obtained by
restricting the column indices of Xi to the elements in U .
In Algorithm 1, for each worker i to update wi according to (6), where the partial gradient of φ
with respect to wiU is equal to ∇iUφ(Xw;y) = XTiUφ′(
∑m
j=1Xjwj ;y) and worker i has only (Xi,wi),
every other worker j sends Xjwj to the master, who computes φ′(
∑m
j=1Xjwj ;y) (see Footnote 2) and
sends it back to all the workers. Observe that, even if one worker is corrupt, it can send an adversarially
chosen vector to make the computation at the master deviate arbitrarily from the desired computation,
which may adversely affect the update at all the worker nodes subsequently.4 Similarly, corrupt workers
can send adversarially chosen information to affect the stopping criterion.
3Here we are not optimizing the average of loss functions – since n is a fixed number, this does not affect the solution
space.
4Specifically, suppose the i’th worker is corrupt and the adversary wants master to compute φ′(Xw + e;y) for any
arbitrary vector e ∈ Rn of its choice, then the i’th worker can send Xiwi + e to the master.
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Algorithm 1: Distributed Coordinate Descent
Each worker i starts with an arbitrary/random wi.
Repeat (until the stopping criteria is not satisfied)
1. Each worker i ∈ [m] computes Xiwi and sends it to the master node. Note that Xw =∑m
i=1Xiwi.
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2. Master computes φ′(Xw;y)6 and broadcasts it.
3. For some U ⊆ [r] (where U can be picked either randomly or in a round-robin fashion), each
worker i ∈ [m] updates its local parameter vector as
wiU ← wiU − α∇iUφ(Xw;y) (6)
while keeping the other coordinates of wi unchanged, and sends the updated wi to the master,
which can check for the stopping criteria.
2.3 Adversary Model
We want to perform the distributed computation described in Section 2.1, 2.2 under adversarial attacks,
where the corrupt nodes may provide erroneous vectors to the master node. Our adversarial model is
described next.
Adversary model. In our adversarial model, the adversary can corrupt t of the worker nodes7,
and the compromised nodes may arbitrarily deviate from their pre-specified programs. If a worker
i is corrupt, then instead of sending the true vector, it may send an arbitrary vector to disrupt the
computation. We refer to the corrupt nodes as erroneous or under the Byzantine attack. We can handle
asynchronous updates, by dropping the straggling nodes beyond a specified delay, and still compute the
correct gradient due to encoding. Therefore we treat updates from these nodes as being “erased”. We
refer to these as erasures/stragglers. For every worker i that sends a message to the master, we can
assume, without loss of generality, that the master receives ui + ei, where ui is the true vector, and
ei = 0 if the i’th node is honest, otherwise can be arbitrary. We denote the set of worker nodes under
the Byzantine attack by A1 and straggling worker nodes by A2, where A1,A2 ⊂ [m], |A1| ≤ t, |A2| ≤ s,
for some s, t that we will decide later. The adversarial nodes can collude, and can even know the data
of other workers. The master node does not know which t worker nodes are corrupted, but knows t,
the maximum possible number of adversarial nodes. We propose a method that mitigates the effects of
both of these anomalies.
Remark 1. A well-studied problem is that of asynchronous distributed optimization, where the workers
can have different delays in updates [DB13]. One mechanism to deal with this is to wait for a subset of
responses, before proceeding to the next iteration, treating the others as missing (or erasures) [KSDY17].
Byzantine attacks are quite distinct from such erasures, as the adversary can report wrong local gradients,
requiring the master node to create mechanisms to overcome such attacks. If the master node simply
aggregates the collected updates as in (4), the computed gradient could be arbitrarily far away from the
true one, even with a single adversary [MGR18].
5After the 1st iteration, worker i need not multiply Xi with wi to obtain Xiwi in every iteration; as only a few
coordinates of wi are updated, it only needs to multiply those columns of Xi that corresponds to the updated coordinates
of wi.
6Note that even after computing Xw, master needs access to the labels yi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n to compute φ′(Xw;y). Since
y ∈ Rn is just a vector, we can either store that at master, or, alternatively, we can encode y distributedly at the workers
and master can recover that using the method developed in Section 4 for Byzantine-resilient distributed matrix-vector
multiplication, where the matrix is an identity matrix and vector is equal to y.
7Our results also apply to a slightly different adversarial model, where the adversary can adaptively choose which of
the t worker nodes to attack at each iteration. However, in this model, the adversary cannot modify the local stored data
of the attacked node, as otherwise, over time, it can corrupt all the data, making any defense impossible.
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2.4 Our Approach to Gradient Computation
Recall that fi(w) = `(〈xi,w〉; yi) for some differentiable loss function `, and the gradient of fi at
w is equal to ∇fi(w) = (xi)T `′(〈xi,w〉; yi), where `′(〈xi,w〉; yi) := ∂∂u`(u; yi)|u=〈xi,w〉. Note that
∇fi(w) ∈ Rd is a column vector. Let f ′(w) denote the n-length vector whose i’th entry is equal to
`′(〈xi,w〉; yi). With this notation, since f(w) = 1n
∑n
i=1 fi(w), we have ∇f(w) = 1nXT f ′(w). Since n
is a constant, it is enough to compute XT f ′(w). So, for simplicity, in the rest of the paper we write
∇f(w) = XT f ′(w), ∀w ∈ Rd. (7)
A natural approach to computing the gradient ∇f(w) is to compute it in two rounds: (i) compute
f ′(w) in the 1st round by first multiplying X with w and then master locally computes f ′(w) from
Xw (master can do this locally, because Xw is an n-dimensional vector whose i’th entry is equal to
〈xi,w〉 and (f ′(w))i = `′(〈xi,w〉; yi));8 and (ii) compute ∇f(w) = XT f ′(w) in the 2nd round by
multiplying XT with f ′(w). So, the task of each gradient computation reduces to two matrix-vector
(MV) multiplications, where the matrices are fixed and vectors may be different each time. To combat
against the adversarial worker nodes, we do both of these MV multiplications using data encoding and
real-error correction; see Figure 1 for a pictorial description of our approach. More specifically, for the
1st round, we encode X using a sparse encoding matrix S(1) = [(S(1)1 )
T , . . . , (S
(1)
m )T ]T and store S
(1)
i X
at the i’th worker node; and for the 2nd round, we encode XT using another sparse encoding matrix
S(2) = [(S
(2)
1 )
T , . . . , (S
(2)
m )T ]T , and store S
(2)
i X
T at the i’th worker node. Now, in the 1st round of
the gradient computation at w, the master node broadcasts w and the i’th worker node replies with
S
(1)
i Xw (a corrupt worker may report an arbitrary vector); upon receiving all the vectors, the master
node applies error-correction procedure to recover Xw and then locally computes f ′(w) as described
above; in the 2nd round, the master node broadcasts f ′(w) and similarly can recover XT f ′(w) (which
is equal to the gradient) at the end of the 2nd round. So, it suffices to devise a method for multiplying a
vector v to a fixed matrix A in a distributed and adversarial setting. Since this is a linear operation, we
can apply error correcting codes over real numbers to perform this task. We describe it briefly below.
A trivial approach. Take a generator matrix G of any real-error correcting linear code. Encode A
as ATG =: B. Divide the columns of B into m groups as B = [B1 B2 . . .Bm], where worker i stores
Bi. Master broadcasts v and each worker i responds with vTBi + eTi , where ei = 0 if the i’th worker
is honest, otherwise can be arbitrary. Note that at most t of the ei’s can be non-zero. Responses from
the workers can be combined as vTB+ eT . Since every row of B is a codeword, vTB = vTATG is also
a codeword. Therefore, one can take any off-the-shelf decoding algorithm for the code whose generator
matrix is G and obtain vTAT . For example, we can use Reed-Solomon codes (over real numbers) for
this purpose, which only incurs a constant storage overhead and tolerates optimal number of corruptions
(up to <1/2). Note that we need fast decoding, as it is performed in every iteration of the gradient
computation by the master. As far as we know, any off-the-shelf decoding algorithm (over real numbers)
requires at least a quadratic computational complexity, which leads to Ω(n2 + d2) decoding complexity
per gradient computation, which could be impractical.
The trivial scheme does not exploit the block error pattern which we crucially exploit in our cod-
ing scheme to give a ∼ O((n + d)m) time decoding per gradient computation, which could be a sig-
nificant improvement over the trivial scheme, since m typically is much smaller than n and d for
large-scale problems. In fact, our coding scheme enables a trade-off (in terms of storage and computa-
tion/communication overhead at the master and the worker nodes) with Byzantine adversary tolerance,
without compromising the efficiency at the master node. We also want encoding to be efficient (oth-
erwise it defeats the purpose of data encoding) and our sparse encoding matrix achieves that. Our
main result for the Byzantine-resilient distributed gradient computation is as follows, which is proved
in Section 4:
Theorem 1 (Gradient Computation). Let X ∈ Rn×d denote the data matrix. Let m denote the total
number of worker nodes. We can compute the gradient exactly in a distributed manner in the presence of
t corrupt worker nodes and s stragglers, with the following guarantees, where  > 0 is a free parameter.
8Note that even after computing Xw, master needs access to the labels yi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n to compute f ′(w). See
Footnote 2 for a discussion on how master can get access to the labels.
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• (s+ t) ≤
⌊

1+ · m2
⌋
.
• Total storage requirement is roughly 2(1 + )|X|.
• Computational complexity for each gradient computation:
– at each worker node is O((1 + )ndm ).
– at the master node is O((1 + )(n+ d)m).
• Communication complexity for each gradient computation:
– each worker sends
(
(1 + )n+dm
)
real numbers.
– master broadcasts (n+ d) real numbers.
• Total encoding time is O
(
nd
(

1+m+ 1
))
.
Remark 2. We compare the resource requirements of our method with the plain distributed PGD (which
provides no adversarial protection), where all the data points are evenly distributed among the m workers.
In each iteration, master sends the parameter vector w to all the workers; upon receiving w, all workers
compute the gradients on their local data in O(nd/m) time (per worker) and send them to the master;
master aggregates them in O(md) time to obtain the global gradient and then updates the parameter
vector using (2).
In our scheme (i) the total storage requirement is O(1 + ) factor more;9 (see also Remark 4) (ii) the
amount of computation at each worker node is O(1 + ) factor more; (iii) the amount of computation at
the master node is O((1+)(1+ nd )) factor more, which is comparable in cases where n is not much bigger
than d; (iv) master broadcasts (1 + nd ) factor more data, which is comparable if n is not much bigger
than d; and (v) each worker sends O
(
(1 + )1+
n/d
m
)
factor more data, which is, in fact, O((1 + ) 1m) if
n is not much bigger than d, and smaller than O(1 + ) – a constant factor – as long as n < O(dm).
Remark 3. The statement of Theorem 1 allows for any s and t, as long as (s + t) ≤
⌊

1+ · m2
⌋
. As
we are handling both erasures and errors in the same way10 the corruption threshold does not have
to handle s and t separately. To simplify the discussion, for the rest of the paper, we consider only
Byzantine corruption, and denote the corrupted set by I ⊂ [m] with |I| ≤ t, with the understanding that
this can also work with stragglers.
Remark 4. Let m be an even number. Note that we can get the corruption threshold t to be any number
less than m/2, but at the expense of increased storage and computation. For any δ > 0, if we want to
get δ close to m/2, i.e., t = m/2 − δ, then we must have (1 + ) ≥ m/2δ. In particular, at  = 2,
we can tolerate up to m/3 corrupt nodes, with constant overhead in the total storage as well as on the
computational complexity.
Note that when δ is a constant, i.e., t is close to m−12 , then  grows linearly with m; for example,
if t = m−12 , then  = m − 1. In this case, our storage redundancy factor is O(m). In contrast, the
trivial scheme (see “trivial approach” on page 7) does better in this regime and has only a constant
storage overhead, but at the expense of an increased decoding complexity at the master, which is at least
quadratic in the problem dimensions d and n, whereas, our decoding complexity at the master always
scales linearly with d and n. If we always want a constant storage redundancy for all values of the
corruption threshold t, we can use our coding scheme if t ≤ c · m−12 , where c < 1 is a constant, and use
the trivial scheme if t is close to m−12 .
9For example, by taking  = 2, our method can toleratem/3 corrupt worker nodes. So, we can tolerate linear corruption
with a constant overhead in the resource requirement, compared to the plain distributed gradient computation which does
not provide any adversarial protection.
10When there are only stragglers, one can design an encoding scheme where both the master and the worker nodes
operate oblivious to encoding, while solving a slightly altered optimization problem [KSDY17], in which gradients are
computed approximately, leading to more efficient straggler-tolerant GD.
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Our encoding is also efficient and requires O
(
nd
(

1+m+ 1
))
time. Note that O(nd) is equal to the
time required for distributing the data matrix X among m workers (for running the distributed gradient
descent algorithms without the adversary); and the encoding time in our scheme (which results in an
encoded matrix that provides Byzantine-resiliency) is a factor of (2t+ 1) more.
Remark 5. Our scheme is not only efficient (both in terms of computational complexity and storage
requirement), but it can also tolerate up to bm−12 c corrupt worker nodes (by taking  = m − 1 in
Theorem 1). It is not hard to prove that this bound is information-theoretically optimal, i.e., no algorithm
can tolerate dm2 e corrupt worker nodes, and at the same time correctly computes the gradient.
2.5 Our Approach to Coordinate Descent
We use data encoding and add redundancy to enlarge the parameter space. Specifically, we encode
the data matrix X using an encoding matrix R = [R1 R2 . . . Rm], where each Ri is a d × p matrix
(with pm ≥ d), and store XRi at the i’th worker. Define X˜R := XR. Now, instead of solving (5),
we solve the encoded problem arg minv∈Rpm φ(X˜Rv;y) using Algorithm 1 (together with decoding at
the master); see Figure 2 for a pictorial description of our algorithm. We design the encoding matrix
R such that at every iteration of our algorithm, updating any (small) subset of coordinates of vi’s (let
v = [vT1 v
T
2 . . . v
T
m]) automatically updates some (small) subset of coordinates of w; and, furthermore,
by updating those coordinates of vi’s, we can efficiently recover the correspondingly updated coordinates
of w, despite the errors injected by the adversary. In fact, at any iteration t, the encoded parameter
vector vt and the original parameter vector wt satisfies vt = R+wt, where R+ := RT (RRT )−1 is the
Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse of R, and wt evolves in the same way as if we are running Algorithm 1
on the original problem.
We will be effectively updating the coordinates of the parameter vectorw in chunks of sizem/(1+ pmd )
or its integer multiples (in fact, pmd is equal to  in the following Theorem 2, which is upper-bounded
by m − 1 and can be arbitrarily small depending on the corruption threshold). In particular, if each
worker i updates k coordinates of vi, then km/(1 + pmd ) coordinates of w will get updated. For
comparison, Algorithm 1 updates km coordinates of the parameter vector w in each iteration, if each
worker updates k coordinates in that iteration. The main result for our Byzantine-resilient distributed
coordinate descent is stated below, which is proved in Section 5.
Theorem 2 (Coordinate Descent). Under the setting of Theorem 1, our Byzantine-resilient distributed
CD algorithm has the following guarantees, where  > 0 is a free parameter.
• (s+ t) ≤
⌊

1+ · m2
⌋
.
• Total storage requirement is roughly 2(1 + )|X|.
• If each worker i updates τ coordinates of vi, then
– τm1+ coordinates of the corresponding w gets updated.
– the computational complexity in each iteration
∗ at each worker node is O(nτ).
∗ at the master node is O((1 + )nm+ τm2).
– the communication complexity in each iteration
∗ each worker sends
(
τ + (1 + ) nm
)
real numbers.
∗ master broadcasts
(
τm
1+ + n
)
real numbers.
• Total encoding time is O
(
nd
(

1+m+ 1
))
.
Remark 6. We compare the resource requirements of our method with the plain distributed CD described
in Algorithm 1 that does not provide any adversarial protection. In Algorithm 1, if each worker i updates
τ/(1 + ) coordinates of wi (in total τm/(1+) coordinates of w) in each iteration, then (i) each worker
9
requires O(nτ/(1 + )) time to multiply Xi with the updated part of wi; (ii) master requires O(nm) time
to compute
∑m
i=1Xiwi from {Xiwi}i∈[m]; (iii) each worker sends n real numbers (required for Xiwi) to
master; and (iv) master broadcasts n real numbers (required for φ′(Xw;y)).
In our scheme (i) the total storage requirement is O(1+) factor more; (ii) the amount of computation
at each worker node is O(1 + ) factor more; (iii) the amount of computation at the master node is
O((1 + ) + τmn ) factor more – typically, since τ is a constant and number of workers is much less than
n, this again could be O(1 + ); (iv) master broadcasts
(
1 + τm(1+)n
)
factor more data, which could be a
constant if τm is smaller than (1 + )n; and (v) each worker sends
(
τ
n +
(1+)
nm
)
factor more data, where
the 1st term is much smaller than 1 as τ is typically a constant, and the 2nd term is close to zero as
(1 + ) is always upper-bounded by m.
The Remark 3, 4, 5 are also applicable for Theorem 2.
3 Related Work
There has been significant recent interest in using coding-theoretic techniques to mitigate the well-
known straggler problem [DB13], including gradient coding [TLDK17, RTDT18, CP18, HRSH18], en-
coding computation [LLP+18,DCG16], data encoding [KSDY17]. However, one cannot directly apply
the methods for straggler mitigation to the Byzantine attacks case, as we do not know which up-
dates are under attack. Distributed computing with Byzantine adversaries is a richly investigated topic
since [LSP82], and has received recent attention in the context of large-scale distributed optimization
and learning [CSX17,CWCP18,YCRB18,BMGS17]. These can be divided into two categories, one which
have statistical analysis/assumptions (either explicit statistical models for data [CSX17,YCRB18], or
through stochastic methods (e.g., stochastic gradient descent) [BMGS17]. Our method gives determinis-
tic guarantees, distinct from these works, but similar in spirit to [CWCP18], which is the closest related
work. Our storage redundancy factor is 2m/(m−2t), which is a constant even if t is a constant fraction
of m. In contrast, the storage redundancy factor required in [CWCP18] is 2t+ 1, growing linearly with
the number of corrupt worker nodes.11 This significantly reduces the computation time at the worker
nodes in our scheme compared to the scheme in [CWCP18], without sacrificing much on the compu-
tation time required by the master node. Their coding in [CWCP18] is restricted to data replication
redundancy, as they encode the gradient as done in [TLDK17], enabling application to (non)-convex
problems; in contrast, we encode the data enabling significantly smaller redundancy, and apply it to
learn generalized linear models, and is also applicable to MV multiplication.
A two-round approach for gradient computation has been proposed for straggler mitigation [LLP+18],
but our method for MV multiplication differs from that, as we have to provide adversarial protection.
The coding scheme in [LLP+18] for straggler mitigation is using a general-purpose MDS code for cor-
recting erasures, which is analogous to the “trivial approach” that we described on page 7 for Byzantine-
resilient gradient computation in handling erasures/stragglers. In contrast, we exploit the block error
pattern and design efficient codes which have much lower computational complexity at the master node,
without compromising on the storage requirement. Since iterative algorithms compute gradients repet-
itively, it is crucial to have a method that has as low computational complexity as possible, both at
the worker nodes as well as at the master node. Data encoding proposed in [KSDY17] for straggler
mitigation applies to both GD and CD, but only for quadratic problem. It achieves low redundancy
and low complexity, by allowing convergence to an approximate rather than exact solution. As far as
we know, making distributed CD resilient against Byzantine attacks has not seen much attention.
11To highlight the storage redundancy gain of our method over that of [CWCP18], consider the following two concrete
scenarios: (i) In a large setup with m = 1000 worker nodes, if we want resiliency against t = 100 corrupt nodes (1/10
nodes are corrupt), our method requires redundancy of 2.5, whereas [CWCP18] requires redundancy of 201, a factor of
80 more than ours. (ii) In a moderate setup with m = 150 and t = 50 (1/3 nodes are corrupt), the redundancy of our
method is 6, whereas [CWCP18] requires redundancy of 101.
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Figure 1 This figure shows our 2-round approach to the Byzantine-resilient distributed optimization given in (1) to learn
a generalized linear model. Since gradient is equal to ∇f(w) = XT f ′(w) (see (7)), we compute it in 2 rounds, using
a matrix-vector (MV) multiplication as a subroutine in each round. In the 1st round, first we compute Xw, and then
compute f ′(w) from Xw – since j’th entry of Xw is equal to 〈xj ,w〉, we can compute f ′(w) from Xw (see Section 2.4).
In the 2nd round we compute XT f ′(w), which is equal to ∇f(w) using another application of MV multiplication. For a
matrix A and a vector v, to make our distributed MV multiplication Av Byzantine-resilient, we encode A using a sparse
matrix S = [ST1 STm . . . STm]T and distribute SiA to worker i (denoted by Wi). The adversary can corrupt at most t
workers (the compromised ones are denoted in red colour), potentially different sets of t workers in different rounds. The
master node (denoted by M) broadcasts v to all the workers. Each worker performs the local MV product and sends it
back to M. If Wi is corrupt, then it can send an arbitrary vector. Once the master has received all the vectors (out of
which t may be erroneous), it sends them to the decoder (denoted by Dec), which outputs the correct MV product Av.
4 Our Solution to Gradient Computation
In this section, we describe the core technical part of our two-round approach for gradient computation
described in Section 2.4 – a method of performing matrix-vector (MV) multiplication in a distributed
manner in the presence of a malicious adversary who can corrupt at most t of the m worker nodes.
Here, the matrix is fixed and we want to right-multiply a vector with this matrix.
Given a fixed matrix A ∈ Rnr×nc and a vector v ∈ Rnc , we want to compute Av in a distributed
manner in the presence of at most t corrupt worker nodes; see Section 2.3 for details on our adversary
model. Our method is based on data encoding and real error correction, where the matrix A is encoded
and distributed among all the worker nodes, and the master recovers the MV product Av using real-
error correction; see Figure 1. We will think of our encoding matrix as S = [ST1 ST2 , . . . ,STm], where each
Si is a p × nr matrix and pm ≥ nr. We will determine the value of p and the entries of S later. For
i ∈ [m], we store the matrix SiA at the i’th worker node. As described in Section 2, the computation
proceeds as follows: The master sends v to all the worker nodes and receives {SiAv + ei}mi=1 back
from them. Let ei = [ei1, ei2, . . . , eip]T for every i ∈ [p]. Note that ei = 0 if the i’th node is honest,
otherwise can be arbitrary. In order to find the set of corrupt worker nodes, master equivalently writes
{SiAv + ei}mi=1 as p systems of linear equations.
h˜i(v) = S˜iAv + e˜i, i ∈ [p] (8)
where, for every i ∈ [p], e˜i = [e1i, e2i, . . . , emi]T , and S˜i is an m× nr matrix whose j’th row is equal to
the i’th row of Sj , for every j ∈ [m]. Note that at most t entries in each e˜i are non-zero. Observe that
{SiAv+ei}mi=1 and {S˜iAv+ e˜i}pi=1 are equivalent systems of linear equations, and we can get one from
the other.
Note that S˜i’s constitute the encoding matrix S, which we have to design. In the following, we will
design these matrices S˜i’s (which in turn will determine the encoding matrix S), with the help of another
matrix F, which will be used to find the error locations, i.e., identities of the compromised worker nodes.
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We will design the matrices F (of dimension k×m, where k < m, which is to be determined later) and
S˜i’s such that
C.1 FS˜i = 0 for every i ∈ [p].
C.2 For any t-sparse u ∈ Rm, we can efficiently find all the non-zero locations of u from Fu.
C.3 For any T ⊂ [m] such that |T | ≥ (m− t), let ST denote the |T |p× nr matrix obtained from S by
restricting it to all the Si’s for which i ∈ T . We want ST to be of full column rank.
If we can find such matrices, then we can recover the desired MV multiplication Av exactly: briefly,
C.1 and C.2 will allow us to locate the corrupt worker nodes; once we have found them, we can discard
all the information that the master node had received from them. This will yield STAv, where ST is
the |T |p × nr matrix obtained from S by restricting it to Si’s for all i ∈ T , where T is the set of all
honest worker nodes. Now, by C.3, since ST is of full column rank, we can recover Av from STAv
exactly. Details follow.
Suppose we have matrices F and S˜i’s such that C.1 holds. Now, multiplying (8) by F yields
fi := Fh˜i(v) = Fe˜i, (9)
for every i ∈ [p], where ‖e˜i‖0 ≤ t. In Section 4.1, we give our approach for finding all the corrupt worker
nodes with the help of any error locator matrix F. Then, in Section 4.2, we give a generic construction
for designing S˜i’s (and, in turn, our encoding matrix S) such that C.1 and C.3 hold. In Section 4.3,
we show how to compute the desired matrix-vector product Av efficiently, once we have discarded all
the data from the corrupt works nodes. Then, in Section 4.4, we will give details of the error locator
matrix F that we use in our construction.
Remark 7. As we will see in Section 4.2, the structure of our encoding matrix S is independent of our
error locator matrix F. Specifically, the repetitive structure of the non-zero entries of S as well as their
locations will not change irrespective of what the F matrix is. This makes our construction very generic,
as we can choose whichever F suits our needs the best (in terms of how many erroneous indices it can
locate and with what decoding complexity), and it won’t affect the structure of our encoding matrix at all
– only the non-zero entries might change, neither their repetitive format, nor their locations!
4.1 Finding The Corrupt Worker Nodes
Observe that supp(e˜i) may not be the same for all i ∈ [p], but we know, for sure, that the non-zero
locations in all these error vectors occur within the same set of t locations. Let I = ⋃pi=1 supp(e˜i), which
is the set of all corrupt worker nodes. Note that |I| ≤ t. We want to find this set I efficiently, and for
that we note the following crucial observation. Since the non-zero entries of all the error vectors e˜i’s
occur in the same set I, a random linear combination of e˜i’s has support equal to I with probability
one, if the coefficients of the linear combination are chosen from an absolutely continuous probability
distribution. This idea has appeared before in [ME08] in the context of compressed sensing for recovering
arbitrary sets of jointly sparse signals that have been measured by the same measurement matrix.
Definition 1. A probability distribution is called absolutely continuous, if every event of measure zero
occurs with probability zero.
It is well-known that a distribution is absolutely continuous if and only if it can be represented
as an integral over an integrable density function [Bil95, Theorem 31.8, Chapter 6]. Since Gaussian
and uniform distributions have an explicit integrable density function, both are absolutely continuous.
Conversely, discrete distributions are not absolutely continuous. Now we state a lemma from [ME08]
that shows that a random linear combination of the error vectors (where coefficients are chosen from an
absolutely continuous distribution) preserves the support with probability one.
Lemma 1 ( [ME08]). Let I = ⋃pi=1 supp(e˜i), and let eˆ = ∑pi=1 αie˜i, where αi’s are sampled i.i.d. from
an absolutely continuous distribution. Then with probability 1, supp(eˆ) = I.
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From (9) we have fi = Fe˜i for every i ∈ [p]. Take a random linear combination of fi’s with
coefficients αi’s chosen i.i.d. from an absolutely continuous distribution, for example, the Gaussian
distribution. Let f˜ = αi (
∑p
i=1 fi) = αi (
∑p
i=1Fe˜i) = F (
∑p
i=1 αie˜i) = Fe˜, where e˜ =
∑p
i=1 αie˜i. Note
that, with probability 1, supp(e˜) is equal to the set of all corrupt worker nodes, and we want to find
this set efficiently. In other words, given Fe˜, we want to find supp(e˜) efficiently. For this, we need to
design a k×m matrix F (where k < m) such that for any sparse error vector e ∈ Rm, we can efficiently
find supp(e). Many such matrices have been known in the literature that can handle different levels
of sparsity with varying decoding complexity. We can choose any of these matrices depending on our
need, and this will not affect the design of our encoding matrix S. In particular, we will use a k ×m
Vandermonde matrix along with the Reed-Solomon decoding, which can correct up to k/2 errors and
has decoding complexity of O(m2); see Section 4.4 for details.
Time required in finding the corrupt worker nodes. The time taken in finding the corrupt
worker nodes is equal to the sum of the time taken in the following 3 tasks. (i) Computing Fe˜i for
every i ∈ [p]: Note that we can get Fe˜i by multiplying (8) with F. Since F is a k ×m matrix, and we
compute Fh˜i(v) for p systems, this requires O(pkm) time. (ii) Taking a random linear combination of p
vectors each of length m, which takes O(pm) time. (iii) Applying Lemma 2 (in Section 4.4) once to find
the error locations, which takes O(m2) time. Since p is much bigger than m, the total time complexity
is O(pkm).
4.2 Designing The Encoding Matrix S
Now we give a generic construction for designing S˜i’s such that C.1 and C.3 hold. Fix any k × m
matrix F such that we can efficiently find e from Fe, provided e is sufficiently sparse. We can assume,
without loss of generality, that F has full row-rank; otherwise, there will be redundant observations in
Fe that we can discard and make F smaller by discarding the redundant row. Let N (F) ⊂ Rm denote
the null-space of F. Since rank(F) = k, dimension of N (F) is q = (m − k). Let {b1,b2, . . . ,bq} be a
basis of N (F), and let bi = [bi1 bi2 . . . bim]T , for every i ∈ [q]. We set bi’s the columns of the following
matrix F⊥:
F⊥ =

b11 b21 . . . bq1
b12 b22 . . . bq2
...
...
...
...
b1m b2m . . . bqm

m×q
(10)
The following property of F⊥ will be used for recovering the MV product in Section 4.3.
Claim 1. For any subset T ⊂ [m], such that |T | ≥ (m− t), let F⊥T be the |T |× q matrix, which is equal
to the restriction of F⊥ to the rows in T . Then F⊥T is of full column rank.
Proof. Note that q = m−k, where k = 2t. So, if we show that any q rows of F⊥ are linearly independent,
then, this in turn will imply that for every T ⊂ [m] with |T | ≥ (m − t), the sub-matrix F⊥T will have
full column rank. In the following we show that any q rows of F⊥ are linearly independent. To the
contrary, suppose not; and let T ′ ⊂ [m] with |T ′| = q be such that the q × q matrix F⊥T ′ is not a full
rank matrix. This implies that there exists a non-zero c′ ∈ Rq such that F⊥T ′c′ = 0. Let b = F⊥c′.
Note that b 6= 0 (because columns of F⊥ are linearly independent) and also that ‖b‖0 ≤ m − q = k.
Now, since FF⊥ = 0, we have Fb = 0, which contradicts the fact that any k columns of F are linearly
independent.
Now we design S˜i’s. For i ∈ [p], we set S˜i as follows:
S˜i =

0 . . . 0 b11 b21 . . . bl1 0 . . . 0
0 . . . 0 b12 b22 . . . bl2 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
0 . . . 0 b1m b2m . . . blm 0 . . . 0

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where l = q if i < p; otherwise l = nr − (p − 1)q. The first (i − 1)q and the last nr − [(i − 1)q + l]
columns of S˜i are zero. This also implies that the number of rows in each Si is p = dnr/qe.
Claim 2. For every i ∈ [p], we have FS˜i = 0.
Proof. By construction, the null-space of F is N (F) = span{b1,b2, . . . ,bq}, which implies that Fbi = 0,
for every i ∈ [q]. Since all the columns of S˜i’s are either 0 or bj for some j ∈ [q], the claim follows.
The above constructed matrices S˜i’s give the following encoding matrix Si for the i’th worker node:
Si =

b1i . . . bqi
. . .
b1i . . . bqi
b1i . . . bli

p×nr
(11)
All the unspecified entries of Si are zero. The matrix Si is for encoding the data for worker i. By
stacking up the Si’s horizontally gives us our desired encoding matrix S.
To get efficient encoding, we want S to be as sparse as possible. Since S is completely determined
by F⊥, whose columns are the basis vectors of N (F), it suffices to find a sparse basis for N (F). It
is known that finding the sparsest basis for the null-space of a matrix is NP-hard [CP86]. Note that
we can always find the basis vectors of N (F) by reducing F to its row-reduced-echelon-form (RREF)
using the Gaussian elimination [HK71]. This will result in F⊥ whose last q rows forms a q × q identity
matrix. Note that q = m− k, where k = 2t. So, if the corruption threshold t is very small as compared
to m, the F⊥ that we obtain by the RREF will be very sparse – only the first 2t rows may be dense.
Since computing S is equivalent to computing F⊥, and we can compute F⊥ in O(k2m) time using the
Gaussian elimination, the time complexity of computing S is also O(k2m).
Now we prove an important property of the encoding matrix S that will be crucial for recovery of
the desired matrix-vector product.
Claim 3. For any T ⊂ [m] such that |T | ≥ (m− t), let ST denote the |T |p× nr matrix obtained from
S by restricting it to all the blocks Si’s for which i ∈ T . Then ST is of full column rank.
Proof. For i ∈ [p − 1], let Bi = [(i − 1)q + 1 : iq] and Bp = [(p − 1)q + 1 : nr − (p − 1)q], where we see
Bi’s as a collection of some column indices. Consider any two distinct i, j ∈ [p]. It is clear that for any
two vectors u1 ∈ Bi,u2 ∈ Bj , we have supp(u1) ∩ supp(u2) = φ, which means that all the columns in
distinct Bi’s are linearly independent. So, to prove the claim, we only need to show that the columns
within the same Bi’s are linearly independent. Fix any i ∈ [p], and consider the |T |p × q sub-matrix
S
(i)
T of ST , which is obtained by restricting ST to the columns in Bi. There are precisely |T | non-zero
rows in S(i)T , which are equal to the rows of the matrix F
⊥
T defined in Claim 1. We have already shown
in the proof of Claim 1 that F⊥T is of full column rank. Therefore, S
(i)
T is also of full column rank. This
concludes the proof of Claim 3.
Since ST is of full column rank, in principle, we can recover any vector u ∈ Rnr from ST u. In the
next section, we show an efficient way for this recovery.
4.3 Recovering The Matrix-Vector Product Av
Once the master has found the set I of corrupt worker nodes, it discards all the data received from them.
Let T = [m] \ I = {i1, i2, . . . , if} be the set of all honest worker nodes, where f = (m− |I|) ≥ (m− t).
Let r = [rT1 rT2 . . . rTm], where ri = SiAv + ei. All the ri’s from the honest worker nodes can be written
as
rT = STAv, (12)
where ST is as defined in Claim 3, and rT is also defined analogously and equal to the restriction of r
to all the ri’s for which i ∈ T . Since ST has full column rank (by Claim 3), in principle, we can recover
Av from (12). Next we show how to recover Av efficiently, by exploiting the structure of S.
14
Let r˜j = [ri1j , ri2j , . . . , rif j ]
T , for every j ∈ [p]. The repetitive structure of Si’s (see (11)) allows us
to write (12) equivalently in terms of p smaller systems.
r˜j = Fj(Av)Bj , for j ∈ [p], (13)
where, for j ∈ [p− 1], Bi = [(i− 1)q + 1 : iq] and Fj = F⊥T , and Bp = [(p− 1)q + 1 : nr − (p− 1)q] and
Fp is equal to the restriction of F⊥T to its first (nr − (p− 1)q) columns. Since F⊥T has full column rank
(by Claim 1), we can compute (Av)Bi for all i ∈ [p], by multiplying (13) by F+j = (FTj Fj)−1FTj , which
it called the Moore-Penrose inverse of Fj . Since Av = [(Av)TB1 , (Av)
T
B2 , . . . , (Av)
T
Bp)]
T , we can recover
the desired MV product Av.
Time Complexity analysis. The task of obtaining Av from STAv reduces to (i) computing F+j =
(F⊥T )
+ once, which takes O(q2|T |) time naïvely; (ii) computing F+p once, which takes at most O(q2|T |)
time naïvely; and (iii) computing the MV products F+j r˜j for every j ∈ [p], which takes O(pq|T |)
time in total. Since p is much bigger than q, the total time taken in recovering Av from STAv is
O(pq|T |) = O(pm2).
4.4 Designing The Error Locator Matrix F
In this section, we design a k × m matrix F (where k < m) such that for any sparse error vector
e ∈ Rm, we can efficiently find supp(e). Many such matrices have been known in the literature (for
recovering the vector e given Fe) since the work of [CT05], that can handle different levels of sparsity
with varying decoding complexity. Most of these are random constructions, which may not work with
small block-lengths (in our setting, m may be a small number). Furthermore, they can only correct a
constant fraction of errors, where the constant is very small. We need a deterministic construction that
can handle a constant fraction (ideally up to 1/2) of errors and that works with small block-lengths.
Akçakaya and Tarokh [AT08] constructed a complex analogue of the Reed-Solomon codes from k×m
Vandermonde matrices F and gave an O(m2) time algorithm for exactly reconstructing e from f = Fe,
provided |supp(e)| ≤ k/2. Let z1, z2, . . . , zm be m distinct non-zero elements in R. We define F to be
the following Vandermonde matrix (where k < m):
F =

1 1 1 . . . 1
z1 z2 z3 . . . zm
z21 z
2
2 z
2
3 . . . z
2
m
...
... . . . . . .
...
zk−11 z
k−1
2 z
k−1
3 . . . z
k−1
m

k×m
(14)
Below we state a result (specialized to reals) from [AT08].
Lemma 2 ( [AT08]). Let F be the k ×m matrix as defined in (14). Let e ∈ Rm be an arbitrary vector
with |supp(e)| ≤ k/2. We can exactly recover the vector e from f = Fe in O(m2) time.
Note that F is a k ×m matrix, where k < m. Choosing k is in our hands, and larger the k, more
the number of errors we can correct (but at the expense of increased storage and computation); see
Section 4.5 for more details.
4.5 Resource Requirement Analysis
In this section, we analyze the total amount of resources (storage, computation, and communication)
required by our method for computing gradients in the presence of t (out of m) adversarial worker nodes
and prove Theorem 1. Fix an  > 0. Let the corruption threshold t satisfy t ≤ b(/(1 + )) · (m/2)c.
As described earlier in Section 2.4, we compute the gradient ∇f(w) = XT f ′(w) in two-rounds; and
in each round we use the Byzantine-tolerant MV multiplication, which we have developed in Section 4,
as a subroutine; see Figure 1 for a pictorial representation of our scheme. We encode X to compute
f ′(w) in the 1st round: first compute Xw using MV multiplication and then locally compute f ′(w).
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To compute XT f ′(w) (which is equal to the gradient) in the 2nd round, we encode XT and compute
XT f ′(w). Let S(1) and S(2) be the encoding matrices of dimensions p1m×n and p2m× d, respectively,
to encode X and XT , respectively. Here, p1 = dn/qe and p2 = dd/qe, where q = m − k. Since k = 2t
(by Lemma 2), we have q = (m− k) ≥ m/(1 + ).
4.5.1 Storage Requirement
Each worker node i stores two matrices S(1)i X and S
(2)
i X
T . The first one is a p1 × (d+ 1) matrix, and
the second one is a p2×n matrix. So, the total amount of storage at all worker nodes is equal to storing
(p1(d+ 1) + p2n)×m real numbers. Since p1 ≤ d(1 + ) nme and p2 ≤ d(1 + ) dme, the total storage is(
p1(d+ 1) + p2n
)
m = p1m(d+ 1) + p2mn
< [(1 + )n+m](d+ 1) + [(1 + )d+m]n
= (1 + )n(2d+ 1) +m(n+ d+ 1).
where the first term is roughly equal to a 2(1 + ) factor more than the size of X. Note that the second
term does not contribute much to the total storage as compared to the first term, because the number
of worker nodes m is much smaller than both n and d. In fact, if m − k divides both n and d, then
the second term vanishes. Since |X| is an n× d matrix, the total storage at each worker node is almost
equal to 2(1 + ) |X|m , which is a constant factor of the optimal, that is,
|X|
m , and the total storage is
roughly equal to 2(1 + )|X|.
4.5.2 Computational Complexity
We can divide the computational complexity of our scheme as follows:
• Encoding the data matrix. Since, for every i ≤ k and j > k, the total number of non-zero entries
in S(1)i and S
(1)
j are at most n and p1, respectively (see Section 4.2 for details), the computational
complexity for computing S(1)i X for each i ≤ k, and S(1)j X for each j > k, is O(nd) and O(p1d),
respectively. So, the encoding time for computing S(1)X is equal to O (k(nd) + (m− k)(p1d)) =
O
(
( 1+m+ 1)nd
)
. Similarly, we can show that the encoding time for computing S(2)XT is also
equal to O
(
( 1+m+ 1)nd
)
. Note that computing S(1) and S(2) take O(k2m) time each, which is
much smaller, as compared to the encoding time. So, the total encoding time is O
(
( 1+m+ 1)nd
)
.
Note that this encoding is to be done only once.
• Computation at each worker node. In the first round, upon receiving w from the master node,
each worker i computes (S(1)i X)w, and reports back the resulting vector. Similarly, in the second
round, upon receiving f ′(w) from the master node, each worker i computes (S(2)i X
T )f ′(w), and
reports back the resulting vector. Since S(1)i X and S
(2)
i X
T are p1 × (d+ 1) and p2 × n matrices,
respectively, each worker node i requires O(p1d+ p2n) = O((1 + )ndm ) time.
• Computation at the master node. The total time taken by the master node in both the rounds is the
sum of the time required in (i) finding the corrupt worker nodes in the 1st and 2nd rounds, which re-
quires O(p1km) and O(p2km) time, respectively (see Section 4.1), (ii) recoveringXw from S
(1)
T Xw
in the 1st round, which requires O(p1m2) time, (iii) computing f ′(w) from Xw, which takes O(n)
time, and (iv) recovering XT f ′(w) from S(2)T X
T f ′(w) in the 2nd round, which requires O(p2m2)
time (see Section 4.3). Since k < m, the total time is equal to O((p1+p2)m2) = O((1+)(n+d)m).
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4.5.3 Communication Complexity
In each gradient computation, (i) master broadcasts (n+ d) real numbers, d in the first round and n in
the second round; and (ii) each worker sends
(
(1 + )n+dm
)
real numbers to master, (1 + ) nm in the first
round and (1 + ) dm in the second round.
5 Our Solution to Coordinate Descent
In this section, we give a solution to the distributed coordinate descent (CD) under Byzantine attacks
and prove Theorem 2. To make our notation simpler, we remove the dependence on the label vector y
in the problem expression (5) and rewrite it as follows (this is without loss of generality in the light of
Footnote 2 and Algorithm 1):
arg min
w∈Rd
φ(Xw) :=
n∑
i=1
`(〈xi,w〉). (15)
We want to optimize (15) using distributed CD, described in Section 2.2. As outlined in Section 2.5, we
use data encoding and error correction over real numbers for that. To combat the effect of adversary, we
add redundancy to enlarge the parameter space. Let X˜R = XR, where R = [R1 R2 . . . Rm] ∈ Rd×pm
with pm ≥ d, and each Ri is a p × d matrix. We will determine R and the value of p later. We
consider R’s which are of full row-rank. Let R+ := RT (RRT )−1 denote its Moore-Penrose inverse
such that RR+ = Id, where Id is the d × d identity matrix. Note that R+ is of full column-rank.
Let v = R+w be the transformed vector, which lies in a larger (than d) dimensional space. Let
R+ = [(R+1 )
T (R+2 )
T . . . (R+m)
T ]T , where each R+i := (R
+)i is a p × d matrix. With this, by letting
v = [vT1 v
T
2 . . . v
T
m]
T , we have that vi = R+i w for every i ∈ [m]. Now, consider the following modified
problem over the encoded data.
arg min
v∈Rpm
φ(X˜Rv). (16)
Observe that, since R is of full row-rank, minw∈Rd φ(Xw) is equal to minv∈Rpm φ(X˜Rv); and from an
optimal solution to one problem we can obtain an optimal solution to the other problem. We design
an encoding/decoding scheme such that when we optimize the encoded problem (16) using Algorithm
1, the vector v that we get in each iteration is of the form v = R+w for some vector w ∈ Rd.12 It may
not be clear why we need this, but as we see later, this property will be crucial in our solution.
Now, instead of solving (15), we solve its encoded form (16) using Algorithm 1 (with decoding at
the master), where each worker i stores X˜Ri = XRi and is responsible for updating (some coordinates
of) vi. In the following, let U ⊆ [p] be a fixed arbitrary subset of [p]. Let v0 := R+w0 for some w0 at
time t = 0. Suppose, at the beginning of the t’th iteration, we have vt = R+wt for some wt, and each
worker i updates vtiU according to
vt+1iU = v
t
iU − αt∇iUφ(X˜Rvt), (17)
where ∇iUφ(X˜Rvt) = (X˜RiU )Tφ′(X˜Rvt). Recall that each Ri is a d× p matrix, and each R+i := (R+)i
is a p×d matrix. We denote by RiU the d×|U| matrix obtained by restricting the columns of Ri to the
elements of U . Analogously, we denote by R+iU := (R+)iU the |U|×d matrix obtained by restricting the
rows of R+i to the elements of U . With this, we can write X˜RiU = XRiU . Now, (17) can be equivalently
written as
vt+1iU = v
t
iU − αtRTiUXTφ′(X˜Rvt). (18)
In order to update vtiU , worker i requires φ
′(X˜Rvt), where X˜Rvt =
∑m
j=1 X˜
R
j v
t
j and worker i has only
(X˜Ri ,v
t
i). Since v
t = R+wt, we have X˜Rvt = XRvt = Xwt. So, it suffices to compute Xwt at the
master node – once master has Xwt, it can locally compute φ′(Xwt) and send it to all the workers.
12If such a w exists, then it is unique. This follows from the fact that R+ is of full column-rank
17
Computing Xwt is the distributed matrix-vector (MV) multiplication problem, where the matrix X is
fixed and we want to compute Xwt for any vector wt in the presence of an adversary. In Section 4, we
give a method for performing distributed MV multiplication in the presence of an adversary. Now we
give an overview, together-with an improvement on its computational complexity.
We encode X using an encoding matrix L ∈ R(p′m)×n. Let L = [LT1 LT2 . . . LTm]T , where each Li
is a p′ × n matrix with p′ = d nm−2te. Each Li has p′ rows and n columns, and has the same structure
as that of Si from (11). Worker i stores X˜Li = LiX. To compute Xw, master sends w to all the
workers; worker i responds with LiXw + ei, where ei = 0 if the i’th worker is honest, otherwise can
be arbitrary; upon receiving {LiXw + ei}mi=1, where at most t of the ei’s can be non-zero, master
applies the decoding procedure and recovers Xw back. We can improve the computational complexity
of this method significantly by observing that, in each iteration of our distributed CD algorithm, only
a few coordinate of w gets updated and the rest of the coordinates remain unchanged. (Looking ahead,
when each worker updates viU ’s according to (17), it automatically updates wf(U) according to (6) –
for a specific function f as defined in (21) – where v and w satisfy v = R+w.) This implies that
for computing Xw, master only needs to send the updated coordinates to the workers and keeps the
result from the previous MV product with itself. This significantly reduces the local computation at
the worker nodes, as now they only need to perform a local MV product of a matrix of size p′ × |f(U)|
and a vector of length |f(U)|. See Section 4 for details.
Our goal in each iteration of CD is to update some coordinates of the original parameter vector w;
instead, by solving the encoded problem, we are updating coordinates of the transformed vector v. We
would like to design an algorithm/encoding such that it has exactly the same convergence properties as
if we are running the distributed CD on the original problem without any adversary! For this, naturally,
we would like our algorithm to satisfy the following property:
Update on any (small) subset of coordinates of w should be achieved by updating some (small) subset
of coordinates of vi’s; and, by updating those coordinates of vi’s, we should be able to efficiently recover
the correspondingly updated coordinates of w. Furthermore, this should be doable despite the errors
injected by the adversary in every iteration of the algorithm.
Note that if each coordinate of v depends on too many coordinates of w, then updating a few
coordinates of v may affect many coordinates of w, and it becomes information-theoretically impossible
to satisfy the above property (even without the presence of an adversary). This imposes a restriction
that each row of R+ must have few non-zero entries, in such a way that updating vtiU ’s, for any choice
of U ⊆ [p], will collectively update only a subset (which may potentially depend on U) of coordinates of
the original parameter vector wt, and we can uniquely and efficiently recover those updated coordinates
of wt, even from the erroneous vectors {vt+1iU +eiU}mi=1, where at most t out of m error vectors {eiU}mi=1
are non-zero and may have arbitrary entries. In order to achieve this, we will design a sparse encoding
matrix R+ (which in turn determines R), that satisfies the following properties:
P.1 R+ has structured sparsity, which induces a map f : [p]→ P([d]) (where P([d]) denotes the power
set of [d]) such that
(a) {f(i) : i ∈ [p]} partitions {1, 2, . . . , d}, i.e., for every i, j ∈ [p], such that i 6= j, we have
f(i) ∩ f(j) = ∅ and that ⋃pi=1 f(i) = [d].
(b) |f(i)| = |f(j)| for every i, j ∈ [p− 1], and |f(p)| ≤ |f(i)|, for any i ∈ [p− 1].
(c) For any U ⊆ [p], define f(U) := ∪j∈Uf(j). If we update vtiU , ∀i ∈ [m], according to (18), it
automatically updates wtf(U) according to
wt+1f(U) = w
t
f(U) − αtXTf(U)φ′(Xwt). (19)
If we set vt+1
iU := v
t
iU and w
t+1
f(U) := w
t
f(U), then v
t+1 = R+wt+1, i.e., our invariant holds.
Note that (19) is the same update rule if we run the plain CD algorithm to update wf(U). In fact,
our encoding matrix satisfies a stronger property, that vt+1iU = R
+
iU ,f(U)w
t+1
f(U) holds for every i ∈ [m],
U ⊆ [p], where R+iU ,f(U) denotes the |U| × |f(U)| matrix obtained from R+iU by restricting its column
indices to the elements in f(U).
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Figure 2 This figure shows our 2-round approach to the Byzantine-resilient distributed coordinate descent (CD) for solving
(15) using data encoding and real-error correction. We encode X with the encoding matrix [R1 . . . Rm] ∈ Rd×p2m and
store X˜Ri := XRi at the i’th worker and solve (16) over an enlarged parameter vector v ∈ Rp2m. At the t’th iteration,
for some U ⊆ [p2], the update at the i’th worker is vt+1iU = vtiU − αtRTiUXTφ′(X˜Rvt), which requires φ′(X˜Rvt), where
X˜Rvt = Xwt. The first part of the figure is for providing φ′(Xwt) to every worker in each iteration so that they can
update vtiU ’s. For this, we encode X using the encoding matrix [LT1 . . . LTm]T ∈ Rp1m×n and store X˜Li := LiX at worker
i. The encoding has the property that we can recover Xwt from the erroneous vectors {X˜Li wt + ei}mi=1, where at most
t of the ei’s are non-zero and can be arbitrary. We can make it computationally more efficient at the workers’ side by
observing that, in each iteration, only a subset of coordinates of w are being updated: suppose we updated vtiU′ ’s in
the t’th iteration, which automatically updated wtf(U′). Since w
t
[d]\f(U′) remain unchanged, we need to send only w
t
f(U′)
to the workers – in the figure, to take care of a technicality, we let master broadcast w¯tf(U′) := w
t−1
f(U′) − wtf(U′), each
worker i computes X˜iw¯tf(U′) and sends it backs to the master. Since master keeps Xw
t−1 from the previous iteration with
itself, it can compute Xwt. The set of corrupt workers may be different in different rounds – the corrupt ones are shown
in red color and they can send arbitrary outcomes to master. Once master has recovered Xwt, it computes φ′(Xwt)
and broadcasts it; upon receiving it worker i updates vt+1iU and sends it back. By P.1, this reflects an update on w
t+1
f(U)
according to (19); and by P.2, the master can recover wt+1f(U).
P.2 We can efficiently recover wt+1f(U) from the erroneous vectors {vt+1iU + eiU}mi=1, where at most t of
eiU ’s are non-zero and may have arbitrary entries. Since vt+1iU = R
+
iU ,f(U)w
t+1
f(U), for every i ∈ [m],
U ⊆ [p], this property requires that not only R+, but its sub-matrices also have error correcting
capabilities!
Remark 8. Note that P.1 implies that for every i ∈ [p], we have |f(i)| ≤ d/p. As we see later,
this will be equal to m/(1 + ) for some  > 0 which is determined by the corruption threshold. This
means that in each iteration of the CD algorithm running on the modified encoded problem, we will be
effectively updating the coordinates of the parameter vector w in chunks of size m/(1 + ) or its integer
multiples. In particular, if each worker i updates k coordinates of vi, then km/(1 + ) coordinates of
w will get updated. For comparison, Algorithm 1 updates km coordinates of the parameter vector w in
each iteration, if each worker updates k coordinates in that iteration.
Now we design an encoding matrix R+ and a decoding method that satisfy P.1 and P.2.
5.1 Encoding and Decoding
In this section, we first design an encoding matrix R+ that satisfies P.1. R+ will be such that it has
orthonormal rows, so, R is easy to compute, R = (R+)T . For simplicity, we denote R+ by S. We
show that the encoding matrix that we design for the MV multiplication in Section 4 satisfies all the
properties that we want.13 In the MV multiplication, we had a fixed matrix A and the master node
13The encoding and decoding of this section is based on the corresponding algorithms from Section 4.
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wants to compute Aw for any vector w of its choice. In the solution presented in Section 4, we encode
A and store SiA at the i’th worker node. Now, the master sends w to all the worker nodes, and each
worker i responds with SiAw+ ei, where ei = 0 if worker i is honest, otherwise can be arbitrary. Once
master receives {SiAw+ei}mi=1, it can run the error correcting procedure to recover Aw. To apply this
in our setting, we take A to be the identity matrix, such that SiA = Si, and the master can recover w
from {ri = Siw+ ei}mi=1, if at most t of the ei’s are non-zero. For convenience, we rewrite the encoding
matrix Si for the i’th worker node from Section 4.2 below:
Si =

b1i . . . bqi
. . .
b1i . . . bqi
b1i . . . bli

p×d
(20)
Here q = (m − 2t) and l = d − (p − 1)q, where p = ddq e. Note that 1 ≤ l < q, and if q divides d, then
l = q. All the unspecified entries of Si are zero. By stacking up the Si’s gives us our desired encoding
matrix S = [ST1 ST2 . . . STm]T . Note that b1i, b2i, . . . , bqi are such that if we let bi = [bi1 bi2 . . . bim]T for
every i ∈ [q], then {b1,b2, . . . ,bq} is a set of orthonormal vectors. This implies that S is orthonormal,
and, therefore, S+ = ST . By taking R = ST , we have R+ = S. Now we show that S satisfies P.1-P.2.
Our Encoding Satisfies P.1. We need to show a map f : [p] → P([d]) that satisfies P.1. Let us
define the function f as follows, where (q = m− 2t) and p = ddq e:
f(i) :=
{
[(i− 1) ∗ q + 1 : i ∗ q] if 1 ≤ i < p,
[(p− 1) ∗ q + 1 : d] if i = p,
(21)
and for any U ⊆ [p], we define f(U) := ∪i∈Uf(i). It is clear from the definition of f that (i) {f(i) : i ∈ [p]}
partitions [d]; (ii) for every i ∈ [p− 1] we have |f(i)| = q, and that |f(p)| ≤ q. Recall that q = m− 2t.
For the 3rd property, note that, for any U ⊆ [p], all the columns of SiU whose indices belong to [d]\f(U)
are identically zero, which implies that we have
SiUw = SiU ,f(U)wf(U), for every w ∈ Rd, (22)
which in turn implies that
SiUXT = SiU ,f(U)XTf(U). (23)
Since S+ = ST , we have S+iU = S
T
iU for every i ∈ [m] and every U ⊆ [p]. With these, our update rule
vt+1iU = SiUw
t − αtSiUXTφ′(Xwt)14 can equivalently be written as
vt+1iU = SiU ,f(U)w
t+1
f(U), (24)
where
wt+1f(U) = w
t
f(U) − αtXTf(U)φ′(Xwt). (25)
Observe that (25) is the same update rule as (19), which implies that if each worker i updates viU
according to the CD update rule, then the collective update at all the worker nodes automatically
updates wf(U) according the CD update rule. Now we show that our invariant vt+1 = Swt+1 is
maintained. We show this by induction. Base case v0 = Sw0 holds by construction. For the inductive
case, assume that vt = Swt holds at time t and we show vt+1 = Swt+1 holds at time t+ 1.
14We emphasize that we used S+ = ST crucially to equivalently write our update rule vt+1iU = R
+
iUw
t−αRTiUXTφ′(Xwt)
from (18) as vt+1iU = SiUw
t − αtSiUXTφ′(Xwt). This follows because S+ = ST and we take R+ = S, which together
imply that R+iU = R
T
iU = SiU .
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Define U := [p] \ U and f(U) := [d] \ f(U). Since we did not update vt
iU ’s, we have v
t+1
iU = v
t
iU for
every i ∈ [m]. This, together with the inductive hypothesis (i.e., vt = Swt), implies that
vt+1
iU = SiUw
t. (26)
Since f(U) = f(U), we have from (22) that
SiUw
t = S
iU ,f(U)w
t
f(U). (27)
It is clear from (25) that wt
f(U) did not get an update when we updated v
t
iU ’s, which implies that
wt+1
f(U) = w
t
f(U). Substituting this in (27) gives SiUw
t = S
iU ,f(U)w
t+1
f(U), which, by (22), yields SiUw
t =
SiUw
t+1. This, together with (26), implies
vt+1
iU = SiUw
t+1. (28)
We already have from (22) and (24) that
vt+1iU = SiUw
t+1. (29)
Since (28) and (29) hold for every i ∈ [m], we have vt+1 = Swt+1. Hence, the invariant is maintained.
Our Encoding Satisfies P.2. If we let
v[m]U := [vT1U v
T
2U . . .v
T
mU ]
T ,
S[m]U ,f(U) := [ST1U ,f(U) S
T
2U ,f(U) . . .S
T
mU ,f(U)]
T ,
then the collective update (24) from all the workers can be written as
vt+1[m]U = S[m]U ,f(U)w
t+1
f(U). (30)
It is easy to verify that for every choice of U ⊆ [p], S[m]U ,f(U) is a full column-rank matrix, which
implies that we can in principle recover the updated wt+1f(U) from v
t+1
[m]U = S[m]U ,f(U)w
t+1
f(U). Now we
show that not only can we recover wt+1f(U) from {SiU ,f(U)wt+1f(U)}mi=1, but also efficiently recover wt+1f(U)
from the erroneous vectors {SiU ,f(U)wt+1f(U) + eiU}mi=1, where at most t out of m error vectors {eiU}mi=1
are non-zero and may have arbitrary entries. Let U = {j1, j2, . . . , j|U|}, and for every i ∈ [m], let
eiU = [eij1eij2 . . . eij|U| ]
T . Master equivalently writes {SiU ,f(U)wt+1f(U) + eiU}mi=1 as |U| systems of linear
equations.
h˜i(w
t+1
f(U)) = S˜i,f(U)w
t+1
f(U) + e˜i, i ∈ U , (31)
where, for every i ∈ U , e˜i = [e1i, e2i, . . . , emi]T and S˜i,f(U) is anm×|f(U)| matrix whose j’th row is equal
to the i’th row of SjU , for every j ∈ [m]. Note that at most t entries in each e˜i are non-zero. Observe
that {SiU ,f(U)wt+1f(U) + eiU}mi=1 and {S˜i,f(U)wt+1f(U) + e˜i}i∈U are equivalent systems of linear equations,
and we can get one from the other. Observe that (31) is similar to (8): S˜i,f(U) is equal to S˜i (for the
same i) with some of its zero columns removed; and adding zero columns to S˜i,f(U) will not change the
value of h˜i(wt+1f(U)). Now, using the machinery developed in Section 4 we can recover w
t+1
f(U) from (31) in
O(|U|m2) time.
5.2 Resource Requirement Analysis
In this section, first we give our algorithm developed for distributed coordinate descent in the presence
of t (out of m) adversarial worker nodes, whose pictorial description is given in Figure 2.
We use two encoding matrices L ∈ R(p1m)×n and R ∈ Rd×(p2m). Let L = [LT1 LT2 . . . LTm]T and
R = [R1 R2 . . . Rm], where each Li is a p1 × n matrix with p1 = d nm−2te and each Ri is a d × p2
matrix with p2 = d dm−2te. Worker i stores both X˜Li = LiX and X˜Ri = XRi. Roughly, L is used to
recover Xw from the erroneous {LiXw+ei}mi=1, and R is used to update the parameter vector reliably
despite errors. Here L is a full column-rank matrix and R is a full row-rank matrix. Initialize with an
arbitrary w0 and let v0 = R+w0. Repeat the following until convergence:
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1. At iteration t, master sends (wt−1f(U) − wtf(U))15 to all the workers (at t = 0, master sends w0),
where U ⊆ [p2] is the set of indices used for updating vt−1iU ’s in the previous iteration, which in
turn updated wt−1f(U); see (24) and (25) in Section 5.1.
2. Worker i computes X˜Li (w
t−1
f(U)−wtf(U)) = LiX(wt−1f(U)−wtf(U)) and sends it to the master.16 Upon
receiving {X˜Li (wt−1f(U) − wtf(U)) + ei}mi=1, where at most t of the ei’s are non-zero and may have
arbitrary entries, the master applies the decoding procedure of Section 4 and recovers X(wt−1f(U) −
wtf(U)). We assume that master keeps Xw
t−1 from the previous iteration (which is equal to 0 if
t = 0), it can compute Xwt = Xwt−1 −X(wt−1f(U) − wtf(U)). Note that if t = 0, this is equal to
Xw0.
3. After obtaining Xwt, master computes φ′(Xwt), picks a subset U ⊆ [p2] (randomly or in a round
robin fashion to cover [p2] in a few iterations), and sends (φ′(Xwt),U) to all the workers.
4. Each worker node i ∈ [m] updates vt+1iU ← vtiU − αt∇iUφ(X˜vt) = vtiU − αt(X˜RiU )Tφ′(Xwt), while
keeping the other coordinates of vti unchanged. Worker i sends v
t+1
iU to the master. Note that
vt+1iU = R
+
iU ,f(U)w
t+1
f(U), where w
t+1
f(U) = [w
t
f(U) − αXTf(U)φ′(Xwt)]; see (24) and (25) in Section 5.1.
5. Upon receiving {vt+1iU + eiU}mi=1, where at most t of the {eiU}mi=1’s are non-zero and may have
arbitrary entries, master applies the decoding procedure (since our encoding satisfies P.2) and
recovers wt+1f(U).
Now we analyze the total amount of resources (storage, computation, and communication) required
by the above algorithm and prove Theorem 2. Fix an  > 0. Let the corruption threshold t satisfy
t ≤ b(/(1 + )) · (m/2)c.
5.2.1 Storage Requirement:
By a similar analysis done in Section 4.5, we can show that the total storage at all worker nodes is
roughly equal to 2(1 + )|X|.
5.2.2 Computational Complexity:
We can divide the computational complexity of our scheme as follows:
• Encoding the data matrix. By a similar analysis done in Section 4.5, we can show that the total
encoding time is O
(
( 1+m+ 1)nd
)
. Note that this encoding is to be done only once.
• Computation at each worker node. Suppose that in each iteration of our algorithm, all the workers
update τ coordinates of vi’s. Fix an iteration t and assume that at iteration (t − 1), workers
updated the coordinates in the set U ⊆ [p2], where |U| = τ . Recall from P.1 that updating
τ = |U| coordinates of each vt−1i automatically updates wt−1f(U). Upon receiving (wt−1f(U) − wtf(U))
from the master node, each worker i computes X˜Li (w
t−1
f(U)−wtf(U)), and reports back the resulting
vector. Note that (wt−1f(U)−wtf(U)) has at most |f(U)| = τm1+ non-zero elements, which together with
that X˜Li is a p1×d matrix, implies that computing X˜Li (wt−1f(U)−wtf(U)) takes O(p1 ·|f(U)|) = O(nτ)
time.17 In the second round, given φ′(Xwt), since (X˜RiU )
T is of dimension n × τ , updating vtiU
requires O(nτ) time, where τ = |U|. So, the total time taken by each worker is O(nτ).
15Observe that master need not send the locations f(U), because workers can compute those by themselves, as they
know both U and the function f .
16With some abuse of notation, when we write Xwf(U), we implicitly assume that wf(U) is a length d vector, which has
0’s in indices f(U).
17Note that in the very first iteration, master sends w0, which may be a dense length d vector, and computing X˜iLw0
at the i’th worker can take O(p1d) = O((1 + )ndm ) time. This is only for the first iteration.
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• Computation at the master node. Once master receives {LiX(wt−1f(U)−wtf(U))+ei}mi=1, applying the
decoding procedure of Section 4 to obtain X(wt−1f(U)−wtf(U)) from these erroneous vectors requires
O(p1m
2) = O((1 + )nm) time. After that obtaining Xwt takes another O(n) time. Given
Xwt, computing φ′(Xwt) takes O(n) time, assuming that computing `′(〈xi,wt〉; yi) requires unit
time, where 〈xi,wt〉 is equal to the i’th entry of Xwt. Upon receiving {vt+1iU + eiU}mi=1, where
vt+1iU = R
+
iU ,f(U)w
t+1
f(U), for all i ∈ [m], recovering wt+1f(U) requires O(τm2) time. So, the total time
taken by the master node is O((1 + )nm+ τm2).
5.3 Communication Complexity:
Suppose workers update τ coordinates of vi’s in each iteration. Then (i) master broadcasts
(
τm
1+ + n
)
real numbers, τm1+ in the first round to represent w
t
f(U) and n in the second round to represent φ
′(Xwt);
and (ii) each worker sends
(
τ + (1 + ) nm
)
real numbers, (1 + ) nm in the first round for computing Xw
t
at the master node and τ in the second iteration to represent vtiU .
6 Extensions
In this section, we give a few important extensions of our coding scheme developed earlier in Section 4.
First we give a Byzantine-resilient and communication-efficient method for stochastic gradient descent
(SGD). Second we show how to exploit the specific structure in our encoding matrix to efficiently
extend our coding technique to the streaming data model. In the end, we give a few more important
applications, where our method can be applied constructively.
6.1 Stochastic Gradient Descent
Stochastic gradient descent (SGD) [HM51] is another alternative if full gradients are too costly to
compute. In each iteration of SGD, we sample a data point uniformly at random, compute a gradient
on that sample, and update the parameter vector based on that. We start with an arbitrary/random
parameter vector w0 and update it according the following update rule:
wt+1 = wt − αt∇frt(wt), t = 1, 2, 3, . . . (32)
where rt is sampled uniformly at random from {1, 2, . . . , n}. This ensures that the expected value of
the gradient is equal to the true gradient. Due to its simplicity and remarkable empirical performance,
SGD has become arguably the most widely-used optimization algorithm in many large-scale applications,
especially in deep learning [Bot10,RSS12,DCM+12]. We want to run SGD in a distributed setup, where
data is distributed among m worker nodes and at most t of them can be corrupt; see Section 2.3 for
details on our adversary model.
Our solution. In the plain SGD, we sample a data point randomly and compute its gradient. So, we
give a method in which, at any iteration t, master picks a random number rt in {1, 2, . . . , n}, broadcasts
it, and recovers the rt’th data point xrt . Once the master has obtained xrt , it can compute a gradient
on it and updates the parameter vector. Since master recovers the data points, we can optimize for
non-convex problems also; essentially, we could optimize anything that the plain SGD can. Our method
is described below.
We encodeXT using the dd/(m− 2t)e×d encoding matrix S(2), which has been defined in Section 4.5.
For simplicity, we denote S(2) by S. Let S = [ST1 ST2 . . . STm]T . Note that the j’th worker stores SjXT .
Let X˜ := SXT , which is a dd/(m− 2t)e×n matrix, whose i’th column is the encoding x˜i := Sxi of the
i’th data point xi. Using the recipe developed in Section 4, given {Sjxi + ej}mj=1, where ej = 0 if the
j’th worker is honest, otherwise can be arbitrary, master can recover xi exactly in O((1 + )md) time.
Our main theorem is stated below, a proof of which trivially follows from the recipe of Section 4.
Theorem 3 (Stochastic Gradient Descent). Let X ∈ Rn×d denote the data matrix. Let m denote the
total number of worker nodes. We can compute a stochastic gradient in a distributed manner in the
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presence of t corrupt worker nodes and s stragglers, with the following guarantees, where  > 0 is a free
parameter.
• (s+ t) ≤
⌊

1+ · m2
⌋
.
• Total storage requirement is roughly (1 + )|X|.
• Computational complexity for each stochastic gradient computation:
– at each worker node is O((1 + ) dm).
– at the master node is O((1 + )dm).
• Communication complexity for each stochastic gradient computation:
– each worker sends
(
(1 + ) dm
)
real numbers.
– master broadcasts dlog ne bits.
• Total encoding time is O
(
nd
(

1+m+ 1
))
.
Unlike the two-round approach taken for gradient computation and coordinate descent, we give
a one-round approach for each iteration of SGD. Observe the distributed gain of our method in the
communication exchanged between the workers and the master: (i) master only broadcasts an index
in {1, 2, . . . , n}, which only takes dlog ne bits; and (ii) each worker sends roughly 1+m fraction of the
total dimension d. Hence, this method is mostly useful in the distributed setting with communication-
constrained and band-limited links. The Remark 3, 4, 5 are also applicable for Theorem 3.
6.2 Encoding in the Streaming Data Model
An attractive property of our encoding scheme is that it is very easy to update with new data points.
More specifically, our encoding requires the same amount of time, irrespective of whether we get all the
data at once, or we get each sample point one by one, as in the online/streaming model. This setting
encompasses a more realistic scenario, in which we design our coding scheme with the initial set of data
points and distribute the encoded data among the workers. Later on, when we get some more samples,
we can easily incorporate them into our existing encoded data. We show that updating (m − 2t) new
data points in Rd requires O ((m− 2t) ((2t+ 1)d)) time in total, i.e., O ((2t+ 1)d) amortized-time per
data point. This is the best one can hope for, since the offline encoding of n data points requires
O ((2t+ 1)nd) total time. At the end of the update, the final encoded matrix that we get is the same
as the one we would have got had we had all the n + 1 data points in the beginning. Therefore, the
decoding is not affected by this method at all. Note that we use the same encoding matrices both
for gradient computation as well as for coordinate descent. So, it suffices to prove our result in the
streaming model for any one of them, and we show it for gradient computation below.
Theorem 4. The total time complexity in encoding all the data points at once, i.e., when encoding is
done offline, is the same as the total time complexity in encoding the data points one by one as they
come in the streaming model, i.e., when encoding is done online.
Proof. Let S(1) and S(2) denote the encoding matrices for encoding X and XT , respectively; see Sec-
tion 4.2. For convenience, we copy over the corresponding encoding matrices S(1)i and S
(2)
i from (11)
for the i’th worker node in Figure 3.
Suppose at some point of time we have encoded n data points each lying in Rd and distributed the
encoded data among the m worker nodes. Now a new data sample x ∈ Rd comes in. We will show how
to incorporate it in the existing scheme in O ((2t+ 1)d) time on average.
Updating the encoding matrices. Fix an arbitrary worker i ∈ [m]. Note that the new data matrix
X has dimension (n + 1) × d. So, the new encoding matrix S(1)i should have (n + 1) columns, and
we have to add one more column to S(1)i . By examining the repetitive structure of S
(1)
i , it is obvi-
ous which column to add: if l1 < q, then we add the p1-dimensional vector [0, 0, . . . , 0, b(l1+1)i]
T as
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S
(1)
i =

b1i . . . bqi
. . .
b1i . . . bqi
b1i . . . bl1i

p1×n
(a)
S
(2)
i =

b1i . . . bqi
. . .
b1i . . . bqi
b1i . . . bl2i

p2×d
(b)
Figure 3 Figure 3a depicts the encoding matrix for the i’th worker node for encoding X, which is used in the first round
of the gradient computation. Here p1 = dn/qe, where q = (m − k) and k is equal to the number of rows in the error
recovery matrix F in (14), and l1 = n − (p1 − 1)q. Figure 3b depicts the encoding matrix for the i’th worker node for
encoding XT , which is used in the second round of the gradient computation. Here p2 = dd/qe and l2 = d − (p2 − 1)q.
All the unspecified entries in both the matrices are zero.
the last column; otherwise, if l1 = q, then we add the (p1 + 1)-dimensional vector [0, 0, . . . , 0, b1i]T as
the last column. In the second case, the number of rows of S(1)i increases by one – the last row has
all zeros, except for the last element, which is equal to b1i. Note that S
(2)
i does not change at all.
Observe that if the i’th worker performs this update, then it does not have to store its entire encod-
ing matrix S(1)i , it only needs to store n, q = (m − k), and the q real numbers b1i, b2i, . . . , bqi, where
q = m−k, which could be much smaller as compared to n and d, and are enough to define S(1)i and S(2)i .
Updating the encoded data. Now we show how to update the encoded data with the new sample
x. We need to update both S(1)i X as well as S
(2)
i X
T for every worker i ∈ [m].
• Updating S(1)i X. If l1 < q, then we add b(l1+1)ix
T to the last row of S(1)i X; otherwise, if l1 = q,
then we add b1ix as a new row in S
(1)
i X. In the first case, the resulting matrix still has p1 rows,
whose first p1 − 1 rows are same as before, and the last row is the sum of the previous row and
b(l1+1)ix
T . In the second case, the resulting matrix has (p1 + 1) rows, whose first p1 rows are the
same as before and the last row is equal to b1ixT . Note that each row of S
(1)
i for i ≤ 2t, has at most
(m− 2t) non-zero elements; whereas, for i > 2t, each row of S(1)i has exactly one non-zero entry.
Since there are p1 = dn/(m− 2t)e rows in each S(1)i , updating S(1)i X for every i ≤ 2t takes O(d)
time; and for i > 2t, update in S(1)i X happens only once in (m − 2t) new data points (whenever
the second case occurs and the resulting S(1)i has (p1+1) rows). So, updating (m−2t) data points
at all m worker nodes require O (2t ∗ (m− 2t)d+ (m− 2t) ∗ d) = O((m− 2t)(2t+ 1)d) time, i.e.,
O ((2t+ 1)d) time per data point.
• Updating S(2)i X
T . Note that XT is a d × (n + 1) matrix whose last column is equal to the
new data sample x. Now, to update S(2)i X
T , we add S(2)i x as an extra column. The resulting
matrix is of size p2 × (n + 1), whose first n columns are the same as before and the last column
is equal to S(2)i x. Since total number of non-zero entries in S
(2)
i is equal to d if i ≤ 2t and
equal to p2 = dd/(m− 2t)e if i > 2t, the total time required to update a new data point is
O(2t ∗ d+ (m− 2t) ∗ p2) = O ((2t+ 1)d).
Observe that at the end of this local update at each worker node, the final encoded matrix that we get
is the same as the one we would have got had we had all the n + 1 data points in the beginning. The
decoding is not affected by this method at all. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.
Remark 9 (Updating the encoded data efficiently with new features). Observe that since we encode
both X and XT in an analogous fashion, it follows by symmetry that we can not only update efficiently
upon receiving a new data sample, but can also update efficiently if we decide to enlarge the dimension d
of each of the n data samples at some point of time – maybe we figure out some new features of the data
to get a more accurate model to overcome under-fitting. In these situations, we don’t need to encode the
entire dataset all over again, just a simple update is enough to incorporate the changes.
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Remark 10 (What allows our encoding to be efficient for streaming data?). The efficient update
property of our coding scheme is made possible by the repetitive structure of our encoding matrix (see
Figure 3), together with the fact that this structure is independent of the number of data points n and
the dimension d – it only depends on the number of worker nodes m and the corruption threshold t. We
remark that other data encoding methods in literature, even for weaker models, do not support efficient
update. For example, the encoding of [KSDY17], which was designed for mitigating stragglers, depends
on the dimensions n and d of the data matrix. So, it may not efficiently update if a new data point
comes in.
6.3 More Applications.
There are many iterative algorithms, other than the gradient descent for learning GLMs, which use
repeated MV multiplication. Some of them include (i) the power method for computing the largest
eigenvalue of a diagonalizable matrix, which is used in Google’s PageRank algorithm [ISW06], Twitter’s
recommendation system [GGL+13], etc.; (ii) iterative methods for solving sparse linear systems [Saa03];
(iii) many graph algorithms, where the graph is represented by a fixed adjacency matrix, [KG11]. In
large-scale implementation of these systems, where Byzantine faults are inevitable, the method described
in this paper can be of interest.
In most of these applications, the underlying matrix A is generally sparse, which is exploited to
gain computational efficiency. So, it is desired not to lose sparsity even if we want resiliency against
Byzantine attacks. Fortunately, our encoding matrix S is sparse (see (11)), which ensures that the
encoded matrix SA will not lose the sparsity of A: Each of the first pk rows of S has at most (m− k)
(where k = 2t) non-zero elements, and each of the remaining rows has exactly one 1. Since m is the
number of worker nodes, which is very small, and we can take t to be up to bm−12 c, we have very few
non-zero entries in each row of S (in the extreme case when 2t = m − 1, each row of S has only one
non-zero entry). In a sense, we are getting Byzantine-resiliency almost for free without compromising
the computational efficiency that is made possible by the sparsity of the matrix!
7 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we validate the efficacy of our proposed method by numerical experiments. We run
distributed gradient descent for linear regression arg minw∈Rd ‖Xw − y‖22. Since we are computing the
gradients exactly, (i) there is no need to check the convergence; and (ii) our algorithm will perform
exactly the same whether we are working with synthetic dataset or the real dataset; hence, we will
work with the synthetic dataset. We run our algorithm18 with m = 15 worker nodes on two datasets:
(n = 10, 000, d = 250) and (n = 20, 000, d = 22, 000). For both the datasets, we generate (X,y)
by sampling X ← N (0, I) and y = Xθ + z, where θ ∈ Rd has d/3 non-zero entries, all of them are
i.i.d. according to N (0, 4), and each entry of z ∈ Rn is sampled from N (0, 1) i.i.d. In each round of the
gradient computation, the adversary picks t worker nodes uniformly at random, and adds independent
random vectors of appropriate length as errors, whose entries are sampled from N (0, σ2) i.i.d. with
σ = 100, to the true vectors.
n = 10,000,d = 250,m = 15. In Figure 4, we plot the total time taken (which is the sum of the
maximum time taken by any single worker node and the time taken by the master node in both the
rounds) in one gradient computation, with varying number of corrupt worker nodes from t = 1 to t = 7.
Note that, when t = 7, we have  = m− 1, which is the main cause behind the significant increment in
time for t = 7.
n = 20,000,d = 22,000,m = 15. In Figure 5, we report separately, the maximum time taken by any
single worker node and the time taken by the master node (together in both the rounds) for one gradient
computation, with varying number of corrupt worker nodes from t = 1 to t = 6. Observe that the time
taken by the master node is orders of magnitude less than the time taken by the worker nodes.
18We implement our algorithm in Python, and run it on a machine with Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-33305 CPU @ 2.70GHz
processor and 16 GB 1600 MHz DDR3 memory.
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Figure 4 We run our algorithm with 15 worker nodes on a dataset with n = 10, 000, d = 250. This plot reports how
the total time taken (in seconds) in per gradient computation changes with varying number of corrupt worker nodes from
t = 1 to t = 7.
Worker Master
t = 1 0.152 0.045
t = 2 1.241 0.054
t = 3 4.163 0.105
t = 4 9.887 0.679
t = 5 15.99 0.789
t = 6 30.258 1.286
Figure 5 We run our algorithm with 15 worker nodes on a dataset with n = 20, 000, d = 22, 000, and report the total
time required per gradient computation against varying number of corrupt worker nodes from t = 1 to 6.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied distributed optimization and learning in the master-worker architecture in
the presence of a Byzantine adversary, who can corrupt up to t of the m worker machines, and the
compromised machines can collaborate and arbitrarily deviate from their pre-specified programs. We
focused on learning the generalized linear models (GLM) with regularization, and proposed a solution
for proximal gradient descent (PGD) in the data-parallel framework and for coordinate descent (CD) in
the model-parallel framework. Gradient descent (GD) is a special case of both of these algorithms.
Observing that applying general-purpose solutions to our problem may be inefficient (see the triv-
ial approach on page 7), we exploit the problem structure and give a solution that is both generic
and efficient, based on data encoding using sparse encoding matrices and real-error correction for de-
coding at the master node. We give a deterministic solution without making any stochastic assump-
tion on the data. Our solution gives a trade-off between the corruption threshold and the compu-
tational/communication complexity & the storage required by our coding scheme. So, depending on
the scenario, we can choose the parameters that work best. In particular, with a constant overhead
on the computational/communication complexity and the storage requirement as compared to running
the distributed PGD/CD (which do not provide any adversarial protection), our scheme can tolerate
up to 1/3 of the corrupt worker nodes. We can tolerate up to bm−12 c corrupt worker nodes, which is
information-theoretically optimal. In the case of gradient computation in GLMs, our method signifi-
cantly improves upon a recent work [CWCP18] on the resource requirements, which essentially uses a
repetition code (for gradient coding), incurring a factor of (2t+ 1) in the storage/computation overhead
at the worker nodes; see Section 3 for more details on the comparison. Since our encoding matrix is
sparse, the encoding time complexity only incurs a factor of (2t+ 1) more than what is required by just
for distributing the raw data matrix among m worker nodes.
We extend our encoding scheme to also make stochastic gradient descent (SGD) robust to Byzantine
adversary with similar guarantees as above. Since our encoding matrix is sparse, structured, and have
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repetitive entries, we can apply our encoding in the data streaming setting too. We show that, in this
setting, where data points come in one at a time (and we encode them as they arrive), our encoding
is as efficient as when all the data is available offline and we encode them all in one go. We also give
numerical results to show the efficacy of our method.
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